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The Netherlands remains divided on the future of European
integration between those wanting a ‘German’ federal
Europe, and those in favour of an enlarged, but looser
union.
by Blog Admin
Rene Cuperus examines competing opinions within the Netherlands over the country’s
approach to European integration. He argues that Dutch interests are balanced between
those who look to Germany for inspiration, and those who favour a more ‘British’ approach
which prioritises looser trade-oriented policies over closer political integration.
A f ew weeks ago, I participated in the German-Dutch Forum in Berlin, capital of  Europe.
The topic was the f uture of  European integration. The f orum is not world f amous, but it
may be the most ef f ective diplomatic instrument of  Dutch f oreign policy, where, once a
year, German and Dutch polit ico-academic-business delegations debate hot polit ical topics of  mutual
interest. Af ter all, the key f or Europe’s f uture lies in Germany. Timothy Garton Ash described the actual
orientation of  the European Union quite exactly, and with a nod to Thomas Mann, as: ‘eineuropäisches
Deutschland in einemdeutschen Europa’ (a European Germany within a German Europe).
My thesis in Berlin was the f ollowing: only when
Germany, supported by its partner member
states, can f ind a wise and sustainable
balance between the two notions of  a
European Germany and a German Europe, can
the EU survive and f lourish. This implies that
Germany should not become ’too European’,
nor Europe ‘too German’. Germany, on the one
hand, should not become too European: i.e. it
should not orientate too f ar beyond its own
national society. Such a move could put
serious pressure on the domestic situation, on
the German social market economy and its
f ragile post-war party democracy. Already now,
in a f lourishing German economy, alarming
studies have revealed the squeezed posit ion
of  the German middleclass in a globalised and
polarised world order. The resonance of  Thilo
Sarrazin’s books on immigration and the euro
may be just the tip of  the iceberg of  populist
discontent, which is lurking under the surf ace
of  German society.
A report just published by the Friedrich Ebert Stif tung about the breakdown of  the German middleclass
and its growing right-extremist convictions, points to alarm and vigilance, even when recognising the
exemplary ‘Vergangenheitsbewältiging’ (dealings with the past) of  post-war Germany. The good luck of
contemporary Germany (and Europe) is that the German economy is still relatively booming because of
the demand f or Mercedes and BMWs among the upcoming Asian middle classes. But the construction of
the EU and the eurozone must also be able to survive bad economic and social weather in Germany; it
will need to be sustainable in the long run.
At the same time, Europe cannot become too German either. The warning by f ormer Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt that national superiority premonitions should never return to Germany must be taken very
seriously. The same applies to the perspective given by the other great f ormer Chancellor Willy Brandt:
‘Germany should always remain a people of  good neighbours’. And a neighbour country such as the
Netherlands should help Germany in doing so. For this, the German-Dutch Forum is an important
meeting.
Nevertheless, a question that is becoming more and more pressing f or the Netherlands is how will they
react to a possible ‘’in or out’ ref erendum in the UK? What would the Dutch posit ion be regarding a
Brit ish exit f rom the European Union? Here, Dutch interests, convictions and sentiments collide and
clash. On the one hand, the Dutch cherish their economic connections with the German economy, and
their mutual Triple A-bonds of  good economic governance. On the other hand, the Dutch f avour a certain
Anglo-Saxon transatlantic distance to the European continent, both culturally and economically.
Especially in corporate multinational circles, the Anglo-Saxon f ree-market philosophy is embraced, as well
as liberal anti-statism.
There is also a widespread idea that the European cause is hampered by the f act that in Germany a
great taboo still exists over speaking f reely about the f uture of  Europe. War guilt and the black scars of
Nazism leave Germany with only one direction to f ollow: towards more Europe. More Unif ication. More
Centralisation. More Federalisation. “Renationalisation”, a natural protective instinct in smaller welf are
democracies, such as the Netherlands, in reaction to the Total Union of  Herman Van Rompuy, is a taboo-
concept in Germany. For good reasons, a f ear of  the opening of  the Diabolic Pandora’s Box of
nationalism and extremism dominates public discourse.
The existential question, however, remains whether electoral majorit ies can and will f ollow the Total
Union course set by Van Rompuy. Or whether, as John Gray pointed out recently, the Total Union – as a
f ailed Utopia – will provoke the f orces of  nationalism and extremism, which post-war Europe aimed to
transcend. How f easible and desirable is a ‘German’ Federal Europe/eurozone, dictated by war guilt? Or
should countries like the UK and the Netherlands tell Germany that the war is really over, and that
Germany should relax and consider more options and a better balance between national democracy and
European non-democracy? No European monster construction needs to be erected f or good intentions,
if  it  turns out that such a construction undermines national democracies and national welf are states, and
theref ore risks damaging the whole post-war European Social Model.
Hence, the question is: does the Netherlands choose a ‘German Europe’ or a ‘Brit ish Europe’?  Or has
this choice long been made already f or the Netherlands? By the Van Rompuy salami tactics of  f ait
accompli regarding the rescue of  the euro, and by its sheer membership of  the eurozone.
Dutch polit icians still seem to be divided about this urgent question. Some polit icians – f ormer Prime
Minister Wim Kok and Europe-minister Dick Benschop (both PvdA) – broke a lance f or a more ‘Brit ish
Europe’: f urther enlargement including Turkey and the Ukraine to widen the f ree trade zone as an
ultimate means of  sparking new economic growth within the EU. On the other hand, there is the new
PvdA-f oreign minister, Frans Timmermans, who seems to have posit ioned himself  on the more German-
French-Polish Continental line.
Whatever the options, Herman Van Rompuy presented on 5 December 2012 his new version of  Towards
a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. In this document, he f ormulated the f ollowing preconditions
f or the prosperity of  the Great European Leap Forward: “Ultimately, these f ar-reaching changes
undertaken by the European Union in general and the Economic and Monetary Union in particular require
a shared sense of  purpose amongst member states, a high degree of  social cohesion, strong
participation of  the European and national parliaments and a renewed dialogue with social partners. The
openness and transparency of  the process as well as the outcome are crucial to move towards a
genuine Economic and Monetary Union”.
The blues of  the European project are that none of  these preconditions have been f ulf illed so f ar, nor
will they be f ulf illed in the f oreseeable f uture. That’s true f or a German Europe, a Brit ish Europe, or
whatever other kind of  Europe one can f ormulate. To ref lect upon the gigantic mismatch of  ambitions
and preconditions will be the main task f or 2013.
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